Pollution and Policy by Russo, Patricia V.
Florida State University Law Review
Volume 7 | Issue 1 Article 8
Fall 1979
Pollution and Policy
Patricia V. Russo
Florida State University College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr
Part of the Environmental Law Commons
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida State University
Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact bkaplan@law.fsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Patricia V. Russo, Pollution and Policy, 7 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 183 (2017) .
http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol7/iss1/8
POLLUTION AND POLICY. By James E. Krier' and Edmund Ursin.1
Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press; London:
University of California Press, Ltd. 1977. Pp. vii, 401. $15.95.
Reviewed by Patricia V Russo3
In 1974, Krier found the pollution policymakers' unfamiliarity
with economic approaches to pollution control "depressing.", He
must be more depressed than ever because the solutions he has been
proposing since 1971, 1 and that he and his co-author propose in this
book, have not been incorporated into the 1977 Clean Air Amend-
ments, or into pollution policy to date. The solution proposed here
is the substitution of variable "management standards" for uniform
national air quality standards.
Present pollution control policy consists of government regulation
designed to achieve compliance with one nationally prescribed stan-
dard of air quality for each regulated pollutant.' The standard is
expressed as a maximum allowed weight of pollutant in a fixed
volume of air, over a fixed period of time, at a fixed temperature and
pressure, which may be exceeded only one day each year.7
The authors argue that a uniform standard is economically ineffi-
cient because it fails to achieve cost minimization: the lowest possi-
ble sum of (a) the cost of pollution and (b) the cost of avoiding
pollution.8 As an example of the failure of uniform standards to
achieve cost minimization, the authors describe the debate sur-
rounding California's 1973 effort to devise an implementation plan
that would comply with the national standard. It was estimated
that the number of days in excess of the federal standard for photo-
chemical oxidant in the Los Angeles area
could be reduced from the then-prevailing 250 to about 40 by,
among other measures, an approximate 33 percent reduction in
1. Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles. B.S. 1961, J.D. 1966, University
of Wisconsin.
2. Professor of Law, University of San Diego. A.B. 1964, J.D. 1967, Stanford University.
3. Assistant Professor of Law, Florida State University. B.A. 1965, Florida State Univer-
sity; J.D. 1973, University of Florida; LL.M 1977, Yale.
4. Krier, The Irrational National Air Quality Standards: Macro- and Micro-Mistakes, 22
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 323, 324 (1974).
5. J. KmsiE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY (1971).
6. Presently the following pollutants are regulated: carbon monoxide, hydrocarbons, par-
ticulates, sulfur oxides, nitrogen dioxide, and photochemical oxidants. 40 C.F.R. § 50 (1977).
7. For example, the standard for particulates is 260 micrograms per cubic meter over 24
hours at 250 C, 760 millimeters pressure. The standard for carbon monoxide is 10 milligrams
per cubic meter over 8 hours and 40 milligrams per cubic meter over 1 hour at 250 C; 760
mm pressure. Id.
8. See also Krier, supra note 4, at 325-35.
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gasoline consumption. To achieve the federal requirement of no
more than one day per year in excess of the standard, on the other
hand, would entail a reduction of at least 90 percent, and probably
more. In other words, the price for about 40 more days of improved
air quality, after accomplishing 210 days already under the more
modest proposal, would be an almost threefold increase in the
controls on gasoline consumption!'
Krier has been railing against uniform standards imposed
through regulation for some time. 0 In this book the authors suggest
how uniform standards imposed through regulation came to be the
preeminent American pollution control policy in spite of the avail-
ability of subsidization (tax incentives) and pricing (fees for pol-
luting) as alternative methods to regulation. The origin of uniform
standards can be understood by focusing on several themes in the
history of pollution control policy: policy by least steps, allocation
of the burden of uncertainty to those seeking change in the status
quo, crisis, fixation upon regulation and exfoliation. Policy by least
steps minimized opposition to policy. The law, in allocating the
burden of proving the nexus between pollution and motor vehicles
to those who sought reduction of emissions, placed the burden on
citizens financially less able to engage in research and lobbying
efforts, while the auto industry, financially more able to do both,
merely had to show that things were unclear. The effect of these two
themes led to the third: crisis-severe pollution episodes in which
illness and death resulted. Crisis stimulated government action "by
suddenly making the expense of inaction appear too high,"'" and by
provoking "citizen demands for action."' 2 The result was regulation,
for regulation responded to crisis more rapidly than subsidization or
pricing and perhaps met some societal need to punish the
"wrongdoers."'" Exfoliation (the process of elimination) led to the
discovery of the role of automobiles in air pollution and made clear
that pollution was not a local problem and was not amenable to
local solution. This in turn led to centralization and ultimately to
9. J. Km~ai & E. URSIN, PoLUTIoN AND PoLicy 317 (1978) (footnote omitted).
10. Regarding uniform standards, see Krier, supra note 4, at 324-35. Regarding "The
Great American Regulatory Tradition," see Krier, The Pollution Problem and Legal Institu-
tions: A Conceptual Interview, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 429, 459-75 (1971).
11. J. Kmaa & E. URStN, supra note 9, at 266.
12. Id. at 267.
13. Id. at 285. See also The Pollution Problem and Legal Institutions: A Conceptual
Overview, supra note 10, at 461.
14. J. KMER & E. URSlN, supra note 9, at 12. The authors describe exfoliation: "As
measures were tried, and as they failed in whole or part, layer upon layer of obscurity about
the pollution problem was stripped away. The failure of each 'solution' produced valuable
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uniformity because Congress is less subject to local pressure, and
because uniform standards involve lower information and adminis-
trative costs than varying standards.
In place of uniform standards the authors propose "management
standards." They argue that the primary national air standards
(designed to protect public health) were "conservatively based on
worst-case assumptions, the idea being to protect the most suscepti-
ble part of the population in the most polluted areas of the country
from adverse effects, leaving considerable room for error."' 5 Because
the goal is to minimize the sum of the costs of pollution and the cost
of its control, and because the costs of both vary across the nation,
standards should also vary if economic efficiency is to be achieved.
The authors sketch the management standards approach, which
envisions
time-phased steps in each of which there must be achieved sub-
stantial percentage reductions in the number of days per year in
excess of federally specified uniform ambient concentration stan-
dards. Ultimately, this number would be reduced to a point where
further reductions in the area in question would not be worth the
costs of attaining them. Management standards thus aim at long-
term (but not uniform) improvements, but they insist in the mean-
time upon short-term accomplishments that exhaust all feasible
controls and that enhance air quality relative to what it was be-
fore."6
Criteria of feasibility would recognize "constraints imposed by tech-
nological, economic, administrative, political' and other social con-
siderations-considerations that would bear on the issue of what
schedule of compliance would just approach (but not exceed) that
information about where to look and what to do (or at least where not to look and what not
to do) next." Id.
Exfoliation also eliminated voluntarism as a solution. The authors explain why voluntarism
would fail. Air is common property and, being costless, is overconsumed. In economic terms,
the cost is externalized. Even if clean air is priced (for example, by pollution control devices),
it is impossible to exclude nonpurchasers from consuming the resulting cleaner air, thus the
benefit is externalized. Therefore, the wrong contingencies are set up: rewards for overcon-
suming the free good (the common property effect), and punishments for refraining from
overconsuming the free good, because others will consume it (the collective goods effect). To
set up the right contingencies, to come to agreement on the cost of clean air and the use of
pollution control devices, involves high transactions costs (the cost of gathering information,
the cost of engaging in bargaining, and the cost of policing agreements). Additional difficulty
exists because environmental quality is a luxury good. As income decreases, so does the taste
for the good. Id.
15. Id. at 312.
16. Id. at 329. "The standards would be expressed only in terms of concentration levels;
the practice of providing that these levels are not to be exceeded more than one day per year
would be abandoned." Id. at 330.
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point where any more demanding schedule would not be worthwhile
in light of its costs and consequences."' 7 In effect, management
standards would mimic present policy concerning secondary stan-
dards'8-reasonableness.
The authors suggest that gasoline rationing will be necessary in
most urban areas in order to implement the management stan-
dard. 19 They offer the following gasoline allocation proposal: issu-
ance of a fixed number of transferable coupons to the owner of each
registered vehicle. Those who value gasoline more highly than the
price of the coupons, would purchase coupons. Those who value
money more highly than gasoline, would sell coupons. 2 "If thought
necessary to achieve equity, coupons could be distributed progres-
sively, such that the poorer the owner of a vehicle, the more coupons
that person would receive. ' ' 21 An alternative gasoline rationing
method proposed would involve limiting the total supply of gasoline
and auctioning selling rights to refineries, one right-for each gallon
to be sold. "Competition among refineries for these rights would
give the rights a positive price roughly equal to the windfall prof-
its"122 the refineries would realize if total supply were limited and no
auction were imposed. The auction method would effect rationing
without resort to first-come, first-served allocations and the long
lines associated with that method. The authors concede that mar-
kets in time (long lines) are more advantageous to the poor than
markets in money (their time is generally compensated at a lower
rate). They suggest that "if considerations of equity weigh heav-
ily,' ' 3 then the transferable coupon allocation method should be
employed.
Finally, the authors suggest that the doctrine of federal preemp-
tion of new vehicle emission standards be reexamined. All states
should have the option, presently available only in California, to
require more stringent emission limitations for new vehicles. Once
17. Id. at 331.
18. Secondary standards are designed to protect the public welfare. 42 U.S.C. § 7409
(1976).
19. Transportion is the greatest contributor by weight to-total emissions of air pollutants,
and the bulk of transportation emissions are attributable to motor vehicles. J. KRIER & E.
URSIN, supra note 9, at 18-19.
20. The information costs associated with determining the proper number of coupons to
be distributed in order to achieve economic efficiency are lower than the information costs
associated with determining the proper price for the coupons. Krier & Montgomery, Resource
Allocation, Information Cost and the Form of Government Intervention, 13 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 89, 101 n.44 (1973).
21. J. KRIEs & E. URSIN, supra note 9, at 337. This would appear to be a retrogressive
distribution, but the authors denominate it a progressive distribution.
22. Id. at 339.
23. Id.
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a car was produced for use in California, its use in other states could
have resulted in economies of scale to manufacturers, and might
have avoided the need for costly transportation plans 24 in some
states. Additionally, a less stringent emission standard option
should be made available to states that will be able to achieve the
national air standards without resort to the present expensive emis-
sion controls on vehicles. The authors, recognizing the high admin-
istrative costs associated with designing vehicles especially tailored
to each state's air quality needs, propose an uninspired compromise:
three cars, one more stringent than, one less stringent than, and one
at the present emission standard for new vehicles. Presumably this
will not exactly meet any state's clean air needs, but it will allow a
closer approximation than the present choice.
All this may appear to propose the classic regulatory nightmare.
But the authors offer the following in rebuttal: while it is true that
tailored standards would involve higher "information (administra-
tive) costs" than uniform standards, (1) "EPA already needs and
acquires so much information about each area in order to assess
implementation plans that it is doubtful much more would be re-
quired to tailor appropriate standards for each; ' 21 (2) "uniform
standards have led to high administrative costs in the form of has-
sle, frustration, bickering, delay and litigation; '27 (3) uniform stan-
dards often result in allocative inefficiency, as demonstrated by the
threefold increase in gasoline controls required to achieve forty more
days of improved air quality in Los Angeles;28 (4) the air is likely to
be a more valuable resource in the future as a result of increasing
demand brought on by growth.
As a resource increases in value, so too do the benefits of allocating
it efficiently among competing uses. Since the administrative costs
associated with varying standards should remain more or less fixed
over time, at some point they are likely to be surpassed by the
efficiency gains such standards would realize."
Krier has been urging variable standards for a number of years. 3 ,
It makes such good sense one wonders why variable standards have
24. Transportation plans are designed to implement national air standards and usually
require reductions in vehicle miles traveled and provisions for mass transit.
25. J. KRiER & E. URSN, supra note 9, at 316.
26. Id. EPA is the Environmental Protection Agency.
27. Id. at 318, n.j.
28. Id. at 317.
29. Id. at 318, n.j. See also, Krier, supra note 4 at 330; 13 NAT. RESOURCES J., supra note
20, at 96.
30. See Krier, supra note 4, at 323.
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not been adopted. Krier suggests that the answer might be that air
hasn't been valuable enough in the past to justify such a fine tuned
allocation.' But another legal scholar concerned with economics has
indicated the answer may lie elsewhere."2 Calabresi suggests that
certain allocations of scarce goods involve tragic choices-choices
which require placing a value on life. Placing a value on life pro-
duces a significant externality: the cost of costing-the costs of
"market determinations that say or imply that the value of a life
• . . is reducible to a money figure. '3 3 This externality, as all other
externalities, prevents the market from operating efficiently. In an
earlier work Krier confronted this problem directly, apparently
without recognizing its significance. 4 In that work, he responded to
the argument that when it comes to health and well-being, costs
should not be a concern, as follows: "[iut should be clear that this
objection amounts to patent nonsense. Behind the objection is the
assumption that there is some absolute of 'good health,' and the
further assumption that this absolute has infinite value, since it
should be chosen no matter what cost that choice implies. ' 35 It is
precisely the value conflict between life as a pearl beyond price, and
life with a price tag, that presents the society with the tragic
choice.36 Calabresi suggests that as long as the cost-benefit analysis
is not made too blatantly, the "cost of costing" will be minimized.37
But as the cost-benefit analysis becomes more candid, the "cost of
costing" becomes too high to the society wishing to hold fast to
conflicting values, and the market will be rejected as an allocation
method.38 Krier and Ursin point out that:
[pleople regularly choose at some point not to opt for better
health because they consider that the resulting benefits will not be
worth the costs of attaining them. People take jobs that involve a
high (and unhealthy) degree of pressure. . . because the jobs pay
more . . . or . . . people . . . live in the smoggy San Fernando
31. J. KRiER & E. URSIN, supra note 9, at 318 n.j.
32. G. CALABRESI & P. BoBarrr, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978).
33. Id. at 32. "Externalities exist when the costs and benefits of resource use are not fully
taken into account." Krier & Montgomery, supra note 20, at 93.
34. Krier, supra note 4, at 330-31.
35. Id. (emphasis added).
36. Calabresi points out that other costs are then involved-honesty costs. G. CALABRESI
& P. BoBBiTr, supra note 32, at 146.
37. Id. at 144. "Besides the cost of costing, pure markets have two other shortcomings:
dependency on the prevailing distribution of wealth, and indifferences to societal prefer-
ences." Id. Krier and Ursin discuss only dependency on prevailing wealth distribution in their
book.
38. Id. at 146.
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Valley area of Los Angeles because housing in parts of it is moder-
ately priced."
But it is one thing for individuals to make this cost-benefit analysis
and quite another for government to do so. When government fos-
ters the pricing of life, the tragic nature of the allocation, hidden
temporarily as individual choice, is laid bare; the effect is partic-
ularly demoralizing to the society. 0 Krier and Ursin rightly observe
that "[s]ociety too has limited resources, and it cannot afford to
spend more on cleaner air than cleaner air is worth. . . . [T]he
heaviest cost of protecting too zealously against pollution effects
could be in health costs themselves-costs imposed by other ills
that we have wasted the opportunity to attack."4' But they fail to
observe that inefficiency will persist, the "cost of costing" will per-
sist, because the beneficiaries of other health allocation decisions
will not be readily apparent, but the victims of clean air allocation
decisions will be, especially during severe pollution episodes. ' As
the victims become more identifiable, the allocation becomes less
acceptable to the society. 3
This is not to say that Calabresi argues for protection of life at
all costs-he doesn't, nor to say that Krier and Ursin are not con-
cerned with fairness-they are." It is rather to point out that the
pollution problem is not subject to simple resolution by the applica-
tion of market techniques. Calabresi suggests that the hallmark of
tragic allocations is cycles-movement from one allocation tech-
nique to the next in a restless search for one that will avoid the
tragic nature of the allocation. 5
39. J. KRIER & E. URSIN, supra note 9, at 319.
40. G. CALABRESI & P. BoBarrr, supra note 32, at 145. Calabresi says that this cost is
analogous to the cost of costing.
41. J. KRIER & E. URSIN, supra note 9, at 319.
42. They do observe that "during times of crisis.., it would be odd indeed to hear the
officials in charge talk of what they can and cannot afford to do about the problem." Id. It is
precisely because the victims have been identified, that it would be odd.
43. G. CALABRESI & P. BoBBrrr, supra note 32, at 152-53. The allocation is particularly
unacceptable if it offends egalitarian values. Id. at 25.
44. Calabresi proposes no solution to tragic dilemmas in his book. Rather, he aims at
exposing the forces at work. G. CuALAEsi & P. BoBBrrr, supra note 32, at 195.
Krier and Ursin do not engage in an extensive analysis of fairness, although they do
recognize that fairness must not be sacrificed to achieve efficiency. They do not attempt to
deal with modern philosophical theory on fairness. See also Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 67
PHILOSOPHICAL REV. 164 (1958); J. RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). Rather, they use the
term to mean rational, the opposite of arbitrary.
45. G. CALABRESI & P. BoBBITT, supra note 32, at 195-99. "Since the values endangered
by any given approach vary, a society which wishes to reject none of them can, by moving,
with desperate grace, from one approach to another, reaffirm the most threatened basic value
and thereby seek to assure that its function as an underpinning of the society is not perma-
nently lost." Id. at 198.
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Wherein lies the value of this book? In the introduction the au-
thors suggest: "Study the Past. . . What Is Past Is Prologue."" The
value of this book lies not in the authors' proposed market solutions
for improved pollution policymaking, but rather in their detailed,
well documented account of inadequate pollution policymaking.
That Florida presently has nine counties designated as
"nonattainment areas" 7 under the 1977 Clean Air Act Amend-
ments, six of which are nonattainment areas because of motor vehi-
cle air pollution,"' makes this book particularly timely for Floridi-
ans. Newly formed Metropolitan Planning Organizations in each
nonattainment area are devising transportation control plans. Any-
one connected with this effort can find in this book a full account
of what not to do, and how not to do it. A 1971 attempt in California
to require the installation of nitrogen oxide control devices on used
vehicles underscores a point the authors make repeatedly: although
the past should have provided sufficient experience to avoid repeat-
ing mistakes, mistakes were repeated, with disasterous results. The
control devices were to be installed at the time of initial registration
of the vehicle, at the time of transfer, or at the time of renewal of
registration. Public opposition to installation of the device at the
time of renewal of registration resulted in the replacement of four
of the five members of the Air Regulatory Board (ARB) and a delay
in requiring the device. Lawsuits by conservationists followed, and
the new ARB reinstated the program. Lawsuits to stop enforcement
followed. The California Highway Patrol sought declaratory judg-
ments to define their enforcement obligation and received contra-
dictory judgments in two jurisdictions. The legislature voted against
repeal and then for repeal of the controversial program. Finally
Governor Jerry Brown signed the repeal bill into law, but only after
additional hearings had been conducted. Six years earlier, an at-
tempt to impose a similar "time of renewal of registration" require-
ment had failed.
The authors urge that controls which disturb established patterns
of behavior be introduced gradually and sensibly. 9 They also urge
increased federal and state cooperation in pollution policymaking,
The inevitability of cycles where tragic allocations are involved suggests that some of
Krier's ideas will be adopted-for a while. Indeed there may be some evidence of this in EPA's
current willingness to explore the usefulness of the bubble concept. See 9 ENvIR. REP. (BNA)
1611 (1978).
46. J. KRIER & E. URS&N, supra note 9, at 4.
47. Florida Dep't of Envt'l Reg., Proposed Air Pollution Control Rules for Nonattainment
Areas 31-34 (Dec. 22, 1978). A nonattainment area is any area not meeting ambient air
standards.
48. Id., Introductory Explanatory Notes 1-4.
49. J. KwER & E. URsnm. supra note 9, at 335.
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and demonstrate how sadly lacking this cooperation has been in the
past.
Lag is the final theme the authors identify in the history of pollu-
tion policymaking. They define lag as the delay between the recog-
nition of a problem and its solution, and they make it quite clear
that, in spite of substantial government intervention in the pollu-
tion problem, we haven't seen the end of lag.

